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ABSTRACT: Popular resistance has, following the recent uprisings in different Arab countries, 
received increased media and scholarly attention. Yet, the role that women and gender play in civil 
resistance movements remains understudied. In this paper I analyse different forms, contexts and 
framings of Palestinian women’s protest activism after 2000, arguing that their acts can potentially 
affect social and political change. Although so far unsuccessful in sustaining concrete material 
changes, women’s embodied protest politics, by radically challenging conventional male-dominated 
political discourse and practice, might provide visionary outlines of a non-masculinist, non-militarist, 
yet proactive form of political culture in Palestine. 
 




Before the Arab Spring, most scholars considered popular resistance1 to be non-existent in the 
(generally understood to be) authoritarian political landscape of the Middle East. If analysts did take 
note of people’s protest actions on the ground, they found them to be mostly sporadic and 
irrelevant for sustainable political change. The Palestinian case is no exception. Few studies enquire 
into the potentials of post-Oslo civil resistance as a catalyst for change and, if they do (e.g. Norman 
2010), they tend to pay little attention to women’s involvement in and gendered aspects of such 
subaltern politics.  
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Yet, acts of civil disobedience did and do take place in Palestine and women are involved in them. In 
this paper I discuss different forms, contexts and framings of Palestinian women’s protest activism 
after 2000. I argue that female resistance activism can potentially affect social (/gender) and political 
change. Not only does female popular protest activism receive broad social support, but the 
underlying gender identity of the ‘courageous female protester’ also challenges reductionist gender 
binaries of men/protector vs. women/protected that undergird traditionally male-dominated 
conceptions and practices of formal politics (see e.g. Enloe 1989; Elshtain 1987). A better 
understanding of women’s practical and discursive strategies of courageous action-oriented, yet 
largely nonviolent, dissident activism thus ultimately might provide visionary outlines of a non-
masculinist, non-militarist, yet proactive political culture in Palestine. 
 
 
Starting with brief methodological and theoretical considerations and a historical overview of female 
protest since the First Intifada, I discuss methods and organisations, structural context and framings 
of female popular resistance in Palestine today. I conclude with an evaluation of the social and 
political transformative potential of these forms of activism, arguing that Palestinian women’s 
dissident political practices not only affect ideational changes at political and social level, but also 
force us rethink what ‘doing politics’ means for women living under prolonged occupation.  
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: FIELDWORK IN PALESTINE AND 
THEORIES OF POPULAR RESISTANCE 
 
The empirical data of this paper was collected during 11 months of field work from 2007-2010 in the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem.2 With my base in Ramallah, and later Bethlehem, I travelled regularly 
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and widely, speaking to and spending time with peace, resistance and day-to-day activists from 
different geographical, socio-economic, religious, gender and generational backgrounds. I conducted 
84 qualitative semi-structured interviews with female (and some male) activists and held five focus 
groups with usually between 10 and 20 women in Bethlehem, Ramallah, Hebron, and Jerusalem. 
Additionally, I attended several dozen public political events (political in the widest sense) and spend 
prolonged periods in family houses, participating in women’s everyday life and sharing their daily 
work, which proved to be among the most fruitful occasions to gain insights into the practices and 
meanings of women’s more informal resistance strategies. While interview partners in formally 
registered organisations were easy to locate, interviews with day-to-day activists, i.e. with ordinary 
women who organise loosely and informally in their communities were arranged through friends 
and local contacts.  
 
 
Given the internal power-political rivalries and the fragmented nature of the popular resistance 
scene in Palestine, I was, of course, at times faced with widely diverging explanations of its 
organisational, structural and ideational context. While local villagers active in protests against the 
wall or Israeli incursions often contested the leadership claims put forward by the predominantly 
urban- (Ramallah-)based, professionalised NGO activists, the latter tended to present ordinary 
people’s protest with reference to global nonviolent justice and solidarity movements, so as to link it 
better to what they perceived would by my, the researchers’, world. Generally, however, I found 
that both Palestinian women and men had no objections to speaking to me, but rather considered 
the telling of their stories and opinions to a foreign researcher to be part of their political activism 
(see also Peteet, 1991). Moreover, and contrary to Western stereotypical assumptions that female 
researchers face problems during their field studies in Arab countries, I found that I in fact enjoyed 
privileges, gaining easy access to both men and women, and establishing close and informal 
relationships with women quickly. The more familiar relations with my female informants helped to 
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gain deeper understandings of the intricate web of political and social power structures that enable 
and constrain particularly women’s activism. Such a  in-depth and nuanced picture also proved 
beneficial to distinguish between more general patterns and particular local specificities in the 
strongly fragmented popular resistance scene in Palestine. 
 
 
Studied in this way, the Palestinian case study can contribute to the theorisation of gendered 
popular resistance. Collective nonviolent resistance activism has been studied by conflict 
transformation scholars (e.g. Sharp 1973; Lederach 1995) who have theorised about nonviolent 
techniques to transform the structural context of conflict, as well as by social movement researchers 
(e.g. Mc Adam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Jaspers 1997) who look more carefully at the material and 
ideational context in which activists operate. Resistance acts have also been of interest to 
anthropologists and sociologists (e.g. de Certeau 1984; Scott 1985) who strive to identify alternative 
sites and qualities of transformative agency. Resistance studies are thus characterised by strong 
fragmentations along disciplinary lines and a multiplicity of definitions, weakening the analytical 
utility of the concept. Studies of resistance remain ‘thin on the internal politics of dominated groups, 
thin on the cultural richness of those groups, thin on the subjectivity – the intentions, desires, fears, 
projects – of the actors engaged in these dramas’ (Ortner 1995: 190). 
 
 
Middle East scholarship has also  tended to neglect studying (gendered) subaltern politics through in 
depth ethnographies, for reasons that can be traced back to Orientalist legacies as well as newly 
arising political agendas (see e.g. Cronin 2007; Bayat 2010). Some feminist and women’s scholarship 
has made an important exception to this: In Palestine, for example, local political cultures and forms 
of political agency have been studied more carefully from a bottom-up perspective in the very broad 
literature on the women’s and/or feminist movement.3 Much of this literature has investigated the 
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ways in which women’s social and political struggles are interlinked.4 Additionally to the two 
concepts of nationalism and feminism, Islam and Islamism have more recently entered into the 
debate on Palestinian women’s activism.5 This article builds on the wide array of empirical and 
conceptual literature on the Palestinian women’s movement, framing the analysis within the three 
parameters of nationalism(s), feminism(s) and Islam.  
 
 
I do, however, propose a slightly different approach to studying women’s subaltern politics here. 
Rather than tracing the influences that women’s political activism has on the ways in which women 
articulate and combine their feminist and nationalist struggles (in a Muslim-majority society), I ask 
how popular resistance is gendered. A gendered analysis is crucial for understanding how popular 
resistance is embedded in wider social, political, economic, cultural and religious contexts. Gender 
dynamics have a strong impact on protest mobilisation (and vice versa). All social movements use 
gendered frames to construct collective identities and gender ‘is also constructed in movements that 
do not explicitly evoke the language of gender conflict and, therefore, is an explanatory factor in the 
emergence, course, and outcome of protest groups’ (Taylor 1999: 13). Moreover, female activists, by 
using their bodies as sites of political engagement, perform and challenge gendered norms of 
conventional politics. Gender identities are thus not only instrumentalised by protesters to construct 
collective identities, but they are also politicised and transformed through their various enactments.  
 
 
In other words, in this paper I am less concerned with the impact that political activism has on 
women’s feminist consciousness and struggles, but rather I study female popular resistance acts 
from a gendered perspective in order to gain new insights on alternative gendered (and specifically 
women’s) imaginaries, theorisations and practices of politics. I aim to provide a ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz 1973) of Palestinian women’s protest activism against occupation and settler colonial 
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policies by shedding light on the gendered aspects of women’s internal politics, their cultural 
backgrounds, and the framing processes they use, as well as their subjectivities, aims and 
motivations for taking part in collective civil protest. While relying on insights from feminist 
perspectives on resistance (particularly scholarship on Palestinian women’s resistance), I take 
inspiration from Fraser’s (1992) theorisation of ‘counterpublics’ and Butler’s (1990) 
conceptualisation of gender being ‘embodied’ and ‘performed.’ In using these two theorists, I hope 
to better understand the social, political and cultural dynamics of Palestinian women’s acts of 
resistance, but also the ways in which their bodily and strongly gendered political practices can 
widen mainstream understandings of ‘the political.’  
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF WOMEN’S POPULAR RESISTANCE IN PALESTINE 
 
Palestinian women’s popular resistance activism was most widespread during the First Intifada.6 
With many men arrested, wounded or killed, women started to take positions as spokespersons in 
political parties. The majority, however, did not enter official politics, but participated in various 
forms of informal ad hoc political action. Women’s practices were sometimes violent, involving 
serious confrontations with soldiers, but predominantly they engaged in popular resistance, such as 
demonstrations, protests, sit-ins or visits to political prisoners. Their resistance was also economic: 
women often had to act as single providers and their work in the committees or food co-operatives 
formed the basis for the boycott of Israeli imports. As managers of the household, they were at the 
forefront of raising awareness and encouraging other women to stop buying Israeli products. On a 
social level, women’s networking, which ‘was built on the traditional home visits by women, 
providing support for prisoners, their families, martyrs’ families and all other sectors or individuals 
affected by Israeli oppression during the intifada’ (Jad 2004: 90-91) was equally important. When, 
for example, the Israeli authorities closed education institutions, women were central in setting up a 
clandestine education system.7   
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While women normalised (predominantly nonviolent) popular resistance through their political, 
economic and social practices, the male-dominated leadership of the Intifada solidified a shift in the 
political discourse towards nonviolence and nonviolent popular resistance. To reject popular 
criticisms that nonviolence represents a passive strategy and a form of normalisation (i.e. 
normalising the abnormal situation of the occupation),8 activist leaders stressed their adherence to 
nonviolent resistance as a pragmatic strategy, rather than a moral principle (e.g. Awad 1984). For 
them, mass-based, proactive popular resistance, as a middleway between the liberationist ideology 
of armed revolution and the statist-traditionalist strategy of institutionalised steadfastness, 
constituted the way forward towards Palestinian independence (see Tamari 1991).  
 
 
Popular resistance did not bring independence, but some partial advances. Economically, the policy 
of self-reliance and noncooperation exercised by alternative social and economic organisations 
(which were largely sustained by women’s groups, such as Incāsh al-‘Usra or the women’s 
committees) through the creation of food cooperatives, the boycott of Israeli goods and tax strikes 
seriously challenged the sustainability of the occupation (Andoni 2001: 210). Politically, the Intifada 
produced a stalemate within the Israeli political landscape by widening the rift between the left and 
right. On the Palestinian side, confronting the occupation helped achieve unity across factions (at 
least in the early years) and was crucial for the construction of a national identity, creating a sense of 
empowerment among Palestinians (Dudouet 2008: 14). 
 
 
Opinions about the long-term social gender impact of the Intifada vary. While Abdo argues that after 
the Intifada ‘[w]hat had been built on both the political-national front and the gender-social front 
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cannot be reversed’ (Abdo 1994: 168), Jad maintains that the popular committees ‘were not new 
instruments through which the status of women was transformed. … Women’s roles in the popular 
committees became an extension of what it traditionally had been in the society: teaching and 
rendering services’ (Jad 1990: 261). Indeed, women never shared significantly in the Intifada’s 
leadership and after three years, when (religious) conservatives launched backlashes against female 
activists, their participation declined (Hammami 1990). While alternative gender models did emerge, 
the general lack of security established the family and local community structures as important 
social and political institutions to provide protection, thus reinforcing women’s domestic, nurturing 
and caring roles as mothers (particularly, but not exclusively, through newly arising Islamic gender 
models). Although activists started lobbying for women’s equal labour and political rights, they 
refrained from openly addressing (religious) personal status law and did not criticise gender-
discriminatory practices and attitudes in the private sphere.  
 
 
In the early years after the 1993 Oslo Accords, popular resistance activism decreased substantially, 
as focus was put on state-building. Many of the former activists became involved in civil society 
building through NGOs, academic research centres or think tanks. Since the failure of Camp David 
(2000) the rationale of resistance has gained currency again. Participation in resistance, however, is 
predominantly restricted to armed resistance by a small number of militants (mainly men) (Andoni 
2001). Attempts to revive popular, largely nonviolent resistance as an anti-occupation strategy have 
been made and, since the construction of the wall in 2002, protest mobilisation has risen, shifting its 
centres from urban to rural areas, but this newly burgeoning movement remains ephemeral, 
fragmented (due Israeli policies of spatial control) and without unified leadership.  
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Several actors have put themselves forward as supporters or even leaders of popular resistance. The 
political initiative al-Mubadara, for example, but also the PA (see Stephan 2007) and several NGOs9 
have endorsed popular nonviolent struggle. Recently the EU and other international funding bodies 
have shown more interest in funding principled nonviolence projects (EU 2010), while global justice 
and anti-occupation movements, such as the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) support 
protest activism. While locally initiated pragmatic nonviolent popular protest actions (supported by 
international solidarity movements) are broadly supported by society, foreign-funded principled 
nonviolence projects are perceived more sceptically and often considered a Western plot aimed at 
commodifying, weakening and fragmenting the originally mass-based Palestinian national resistance 
movement (Richter-Devroe 2009). 
 
 
The popular resistance scene in Palestine thus has undergone a process of localisation, 
professionalisation, and internationalisation. Women’s popular protest action is not isolated from 
these trends, but it is often more informal, its networks more loose, and its mobilising mechanisms 
more community-oriented than men’s. 
 
 
METHODS AND ORGANISATION OF WOMEN’S POPULAR RESISTANCE 
 
The main method of popular resistance in Palestine today, besides the boycott, is civil protest, and 
women play a special role. The Alternative Education Initiative (AEI), for example, organises women-
only protests next to the wall, where women hold prayers or sing Palestinian songs, often dressed in 
traditional attire. Similarly, the International Women’s Peace Service (IWPS), a group of international 
female anti-occupation activists permanently based in the West Bank, supports women’s olive 
harvesting and farming on annexed land. In their more informal ad hoc activism, local women also 
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regularly make use of creative and symbolic protest techniques, such as silent marches, vigils, walks 
with candles, women’s ululating, etc. Such specific women’s or feminist forms of protests were, for 
example, used by women activists in Greenham Common (Laware 2004), by Code Pink (Kutz-
Flamenbaum 2007). Women in Black (Sasson-Levy and Rapoport 2003) have, however, not been 
employed on a large scale in Palestine.  
 
 
The main organisations to call for, claim leadership of, and participate in female civil protest range 
from local groups (sometimes linked to popular village committees), NGOs (sometimes with women-
only groups, e.g. AEI, Wi’am, the Holy Land Trust [HLT], The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid 
Wall Campaign [GPAAWC]), and political parties (particularly Palestinian Women Working Society for 
Development, al-Mubadara), to international groups (e.g. International Women’s Peace Service). 
 
 
Women activist leaders express the need for independent women’s organisations. Many argue that 
it is difficult for women to participate in gender-mixed demonstrations due to male control over 
organisational structures. In 2003, at the initiative of local women, a network of Women Against the 
Wall from different governorates was founded in Bil’in, a village near Ramallah, in which weekly 
demonstrations against the wall and an annual nonviolence conference is held. GPAAWC supported 
the foundation of the network by providing specific training courses for women on boycotting and 
popular resistance. The aim of the network was to establish a women’s branch for each (male-
dominated) popular committee in each village so as to strengthen women’s voices in the 
organisational and decision-making structures.10 
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Feryal, a grassroots popular resistance leader in her fifties, originally from Gaza, told me in several 
extended interviews and informal conversations that she had struggled to challenge control from 
political and patriarchal sources in her home district of Salfit. She explained that the first two 
demonstrations against the wall in Salfit, in March 2003 and June 2003, were attended by women 
only. Later, when more people started to join, men from the local popular committee attempted to 
take over: ‘they wanted to delegitimise us [women] by saying that we work with the 
internationals…Men always want to be responsible and take the lead in the demonstration, just as 
they do anywhere else.’ Once the protests attracted more attention, fights between political parties, 
NGOs and other initiatives erupted: 
 
In February 2005 the men organised a demonstration and there started to be problems 
between the different political parties and other organisations. So then most people 
and particularly the women didn’t want to join the demonstrations anymore. The 
problem was that now everybody wanted to take the credit for the huge mobilisation of 
people that we [the women] achieved…So we decided to form the Women Against the 
Wall group, rather than staying with the popular committee. We didn’t want to be 
involved in this fighting. Our women’s group is for everyone, no matter which political 
affiliation.11 
 
The initiative to form independent women’s branches thus stemmed from an urge to challenge, 
circumvent and perhaps even transform gender hierarchies (propelled by internal factionalism) in 
the organisational structures of popular resistance. Despite such attempts, most female protest 
activism continues to take place on an ad hoc basis, often triggered by specific events. Ilham, a single 
woman in her forties who lives a simple peasant life and had been at the forefront of anti-wall 
demonstrations in her village near Ramallah, recalled a spontaneous mobilisation: 
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We protested the first time when the Israeli army came here and brought bulldozers. It 
was in the night, people were sleeping. They put a guard at the entrance of the village 
and they didn’t allow anyone to leave their houses…So us, the women, we all went 
down and we faced them. We wanted to resist them. They were sitting on the 
bulldozers. We fought with them and looked them eye to eye. We were just with 
stones. They fought with bombs and bullets and teargas, and they were hitting us. Then 
one of the soldiers came closer to me and started cursing, shouting and hitting me. One 
soldier spoke Arabic and he told me: “Put your hands up!” I told him: “No - thank 
you…We will stay here until our deaths.”12 
 
While more formal organisations, such as international solidarity movements, NGOs, political parties 
and even the PA have claimed leadership and credit for women’s civil resistance, it is in fact through 
such informal family and community structures at the village level that most local women become 
mobilised to – often unplanned and spontaneous – direct action against the Israeli army. Although 
spontaneous, their acts are, however, not apolitical. To the contrary: they respond to and are 
consciously enacted by female protesters in a set of specific structural political and socio-cultural 
constraints. 
 
STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF WOMEN’S POPULAR RESISTANCE ACTIVISM  
 
On the political level, the Israeli occupation, the PA and the structural dynamics between them have 
severely restricted possibilities for female activists. The Israeli policies of fragmentation, separation 
and mobility restrictions have systematically dispossessed, occupied and destroyed Palestinian living 
spaces. With the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was split into Areas A, B and C, each having different 
administrative and security arrangements. Since then, Israeli policies of spatial control have further 
increased (see e.g. Falah 2005; Hanafi 2009). In 2002 the operation Defensive Shield, implemented 
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through a comprehensive invasion of the West Bank, house demolitions, mobility restrictions, 
infrastructure destructions and construction of the wall resulted in massive economic losses and de-
development (Roy 2004).  
 
 
Restrictions of mobility through checkpoints, the wall, road block and curfews have limited contact 
between activists, making it hard for them to organise and carry out large scale events. Moreover, 
the army’s use of brutal military reprisals through crack-downs on activists and their families, and 




Some interviewees argued that the participation of internationals, but also of women, in protests, 
might mitigate the army’s military responses. However, the great majority of activists who regularly 
participate in protests contested this claim. Im Fuad, a local activist in her fifties who worked 
together with Feryal in organising women’s anti-wall demonstrations in Salfit, found that gender 
composition makes no difference:  
 
If there are only women it is easier to keep the demonstration nonviolently. It is the 
young boys that start throwing stones and that might give the army the ‘reason’ to fire 
… [but in the end] the army doesn’t care whether our demonstration is nonviolent or 
not. They shoot in any case…The army knows nothing about peace and nonviolence.13  
 
Other village women active in the anti-wall protests mostly confirmed her observation, but some 
added that women are less likely than men to get arrested. This allows them to be more 
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confrontational with the army, making them succeed in defending or even freeing their men from 
tanks and soldiers.  
 
 
Participation in protest activism is certainly highly dangerous for women, just as it is for men. Some 
families thus discourage their sons and daughters to participate. Lama, originally from Al-Askeri 
refugee camp in Nablus, has four boys, is a former employee in a Ramallah-based NGO, and was very 
active in the First Intifada. She contended: 
 
Resistance without organisation is a mistake. There is no organisation in this resistance, 
just someone says that there is the army in the street, so we all go out and throw 
stones…[In the First Intifada] we were all still very small, [but now] we grew up. Now I 
got married, I got children – I started to think. I am not prepared to let my boy go out 
and throw stones so that he dies because of the stone. Not because I reject the 
resistance, or because I have forgotten about our cause – no, to the contrary: [As a 
mother] it is within my possibility to start a new generation which is aware, open-
minded, which understands and can think right…not just throw stones and sacrifice 
themselves. The days and nights that I raised my son for 18 years - how can I forget 
them, [just] to say that I am defending my land?14 
 
Her account points to the existence of a multiplicity of conflicting resistance discourses, practices 
and regimes. This lack of unity and security – which is an intended result of long-term Israeli 
occupation policies – has curbed people’s, and particularly women’s, trust in official political 
institutions, often leading them to seek security and protection not from the state, but in smaller 
socio-political units, such as the family, local community or women’s groups. Such grassroots 
(independent) women’s and other civil society initiatives, which win their support through building 
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alternative informal institutions or support systems, have, however, been actively curtailed by the 
PA (see e.g. Jad 2004). The PA’s claim to leadership of anti-wall demonstrations thus is considered a 
hypocritical publicity show by many local activists (see e.g. Audeh 2007). 
 
 
Additionally to (gendered) political structures, mobilisation is constrained by social and cultural 
norms. Among my interviewees, some – but remarkably few – mentioned cultural and social factors 
as a reason for women’s scarce participation in protests. Among those who did, the trend towards 
social conservatism was seen to be a result of the rise of political Islam, ‘tradition,’ ‘normalisation’, 
‘westernisation’, and/or the political and economic effects of the occupation. 
 
 
At least half of the secular, mainly urban-based, women leaders of NGOs or women’s braches of 
political parties I interviewed identified the rising influence of Islamic groups as a major cause for 
increased restrictions on women. Supporters of this argument claimed, for example, that Hamas 
brainwashed women into voting for them in the 2006 election by promising socio-economic support, 
but that in reality they were used as tokens and have no say in decision-making. Such arguments 
were also brought forward by women of the leftist factions, as well as those sympathising with the 
Islamic movement against the nationalist-secular Fatah. Depending on their political leaning, women 
(and men) would thus brand either the Islamic or the nationalist-secular groups as patriarchal, 
accusing them of tokenism and only symbolically and sporadically granting women access. 
 
 
A similar dynamic was evident between urban and rural activists. While the great majority of urban 
middle-class (and mostly professionalised NGO) leaders found conservative patriarchal ‘traditions’ in 
the rural areas to be a crucial factor barring women’s public political agency, village women, or 
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activists working predominantly in rural areas, stressed that peasant women have a long history of 
active involvement in the resistance. Salwa, a young feminist activist who has a higher education 
degree in gender studies and now works with women in a village in the Hebron district, argued: 
 
In the cities women are the least empowered. Their husbands are rich and 
they can therefore put more pressure on their women. He can put her in 
the house and say: “I give you everything, so you don’t need to go out.”…In 
villages women have to go out and they have to work. They have to feed 
their family. They are very strong.15 
 
Such generalised differentiations between secular and religious, and town, camp and village do not 
reflect today’s reality, but they are nevertheless held up to demarcate boundaries and hierarchies. 
While rural and camp women as well as those sympathising with the Islamic movement tend to 
emphasise their active involvement in the ‘resistance,’ contrasting it to what they perceive as the 
western-influenced depoliticised ‘normalisation’ agenda of urban secular leaders, the latter 
sometimes stress the need to eradicate ‘backwardness’ and ‘modernise’ peasant and religious 
women in order to free them from patriarchal ‘traditions’ (see also Jad 2004). 
 
 
All of my informants agreed that Israeli occupation policies constitute the major cause for women’s 
weak protest mobilisation. Israeli policies directly curb activism through harsh military repression, 
spatial fragmentation and mobility restrictions and indirectly through heightening insecurity (thus 
enforcing patriarchal restrictions on women’s mobility as ‘necessary’ protection from gender-specific 
violence and potential sexual harassment) and increasing poverty (thus forcing women’s 
preoccupation with issues of survival rather than resistance). Suad, a prominent women’s activist in 
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the FIDA-affiliated Palestinian Federation of Women's Action who was very involved in the First 
Intifada, explained: 
 
We used to go to demonstration in the thousands, but now people worry about the 
economic situation. There is an increase of poverty, unemployment, loss of hope for 
peace, the checkpoints, and the daily violations. In such a situation, how do you want to 
reduce women’s burden and, at the same time, encourage their political 
empowerment, that they have a voice and a role?16 
 
Economic and political empowerment is a necessary precondition for increasing women’s spaces for 
agency. Israeli occupation policies and military reprisals in combination with the PA’s patriarchal and 
hierarchical nature have fostered social conservatism and internal fragmentation, thus raising 
barriers to female public political action. Within this context, women’s bodies and their behaviour 
have increasingly become battlefields upon which political rivalries are played out. While social and 
cultural norms without doubt play a role, cultural references can thus not be isolated from the wider 
political and social context in which actors construct and instrumentalise them. 
 
FRAMINGS OF WOMEN’S POPULAR RESISTANCE  
 
To gain social support, local leaders emphasise their pragmatic (rather than principled) approach to 
popular nonviolent resistance. Adnan, a father of four whom I visited several times in his village near 
Ramallah, where he is a prominent leader of anti-wall protests, stressed that  
 
We chose nonviolent resistance here not because we are angels, but it is a 
strategy…We are the victims in this conflict - so it would be stupid to play the criminal 
and take up arms, as the outside world wants us to. With nonviolent resistance the 
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world understands us as humans…we resist the wall all together and we do not talk 
about political or ideological debates.17 
 
Such a pragmatic non-ideological approach to popular resistance is often considered to be more 
inclusive, gender-friendly and democratic. Scholars have argued that nonviolent civil action is 
especially attractive for women because it constructs inclusive collective identities and is less 
hierarchical than conventional political arrangements.18 While Feryal in Salfit would not support such 
an argument, women in Adnan’s village (including Ilham) identified the egalitarian and praxis-
oriented nature of the protests as strongly mobilising. During a focus group with eight women, all 
stressed the close relations, trust and equality between protesters: 
 
We set a very good example with everyone participating in the resistance. It was all 
very practical and everybody participated as volunteer. There were no personal aims. 
All the women in the village knew that Adnan’s wife and his daughters and sons 
participate in the resistance and therefore they also went.19 
 
Local activists emphasise the inclusive and action-oriented nature of popular, largely nonviolent 
resistance to rebuke commonly held associations of nonviolence with elitist or western agendas of 
normalisation. This representation might, of course, have little to do with the actual reality of (still 
largely male-dominated) protest politics on the ground (see Feryal’s account), but, it highlights that 
local leaders want to re-establish popular, largely nonviolent resistance as an indigenous and 
socially as well as politically progressive strategy. The performative element of protest action, i.e. 
the fact that it is often performed to ‘please’ different audiences, is particularly well illustrated if 
gender-specific framings are taken into account. 
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Resistance is commonly associated with the male ‘just warrior’, while nonviolence, peace and the 
nation is symbolised by women’s ‘beautiful souls’ (Elshtain 1987). In the Palestinian context, analysts 
of popular activism, particularly the anti-wall protests, often put women protesters in the spotlight, 
preferably presenting them visually through photos or films.20 The main two femininity constructions 
which female activists themselves use (and often merge) to frame their civil resistance are the (more 
relational, and often dubbed ‘traditional’) mother figure, associated with peace and nonviolence and 
the (more independent, and often claimed to be ‘modern’) female political activist, more strongly 
connected to protest and resistance. 
 
 
The mother figure is central to Palestinian political culture.21 Discourses of motherhood are 
politicised in nationalist steadfastness discourses which elevate mothers as social, cultural and 
biological reproducers of the nation, but were also upheld by many ordinary women I spoke to. In 
such ‘mother politics’ (Cockburn 2007) women politicise the domestic sphere by presenting their 
domestic duties and reproductive roles as a form of political activism, and domesticate the public 
sphere by basing their political activities and entry into the public sphere on their domestic role as 
mothers (Peteet 1991: 175 - 203). Many ordinary women stressed that as mothers, it is their 
responsibility to take part in political action to prevent youth radicalisation and ensure the survival 
of family and community. Ilham, for example, emphasised that she had no other choice but to 
protect her land: ‘If the soldiers come and take my land that means that I have nowhere to live. I 
have no home. So what can I do? I have to go out and defend my land.’ Stressing her role as 
protector of the land (i.e. her means of subsistence), Ilham also emphasises her role as main 
provider of her family. By arguing that they need to defend their land women thus launch a 
discursive challenge, even if indirectly and without lasting change, against the gender construction 
(and superiority) of the male provider. 
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Ilham pushed this discursive challenge even further by stating that women must not only defend 
their land, but also their men: 
 
Everyone, including women, have to resist as much as they can. If they had resisted that 
much [as we did in our village] already in 1948 then perhaps it would have turned out 
differently … We women help the national cause and our men – what should they do 
without us? ... I told the other women that they have to defend their husbands and 
their sons, because what should she do if the soldiers take them or if they die? She 
needs them. 
 
Although framings of popular resistance might thus often stick closer to social gender norms that 
associate femininity with nonviolence or motherhood, activists challenge patriarchal gender norms 
not only through their actual political practices (in which they encroach upon a political space 
traditionally controlled by men and associated with masculinity), but also discursively. Their double 
claim to defend not only their land (and thus the means of subsistence, a role traditionally 
associated with the male provider), but also their people (thus challenging men’s, particularly 
leader’s, role as male protectors), of course, does not constitute a strategic feminist agenda to 
transform gender regimes and ideologies. Yet, it nevertheless shows that ordinary peasant women, 
such as Ilham, through their involvement in protests articulate new female political subjectivities in 
which they underline their active roles in social, political and economic life in Palestine. 
 
 
Women also borrow from Islamic discourses. Ilham, like many other women, referred to the 
Prophet’s wife, Khadija, as an Islamic example of a strong resistance woman: 
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Men might say it is shameful for women to join the demonstration. Why would it be 
shameful? We want to resist. We want to defend our land. In the times of the Prophet 
Khadija also went to fight. So it is wrong to say it is shameful. Why should it be only 
natural for men? Women help men in their resistance and women are just as strong. 
 
Ilham is not an active member or even supporter of the Islamic movement. Her reference to religion 
thus, although employed to support her political agency, is not ideological, but rather is embedded 
in her everyday practice of Islam. Female activist leaders, like Feryal, might utilise Islamic principles 
more strategically. She explained to me how she contested male activists’ claim to leadership of the 
anti-wall protest: 
 
In the demonstrations I took the loudspeaker twice and said through it: “Allahu Akbar – 
let’s go to jihad!” As a result everybody came out to see and join. They wanted to see 
this woman who is saying “Allahu Akbar” and calling for jihad. At the same time this 
was their language, so they felt more ready to join…I use Islam to mobilise people. 
When they hear Allahu Akbar, they know it is something important and they come out 
of their houses to see. 
  
In the case of Feryal, who had originally presented herself to me as a convinced communist, the use 
of Islamic slogans is employed strategically: tapping into the normative systems and discursive 
repertoire of ordinary women she hopes to mobilise them for (and legitimise their) political action. 
 
 
Besides Islam, many female activists bring up human and international rights discourses to explain 
their activism. While more professional urban leaders mentioned concrete UN resolution and 
international law, day-to-day activists referred predominantly to their national and human rights  
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(self-determination, dignity, protection, etc.). Their selective appropriation of transnational rights 
discourse offered them a way to connect to the global justice movement and thus opened a channel 
through which they could make their voices heard and understood internationally.  
 
 
There is, however, also a negative effect to the increased significance of international solidarity 
movements: many Palestinians now consider organised demonstrations a mere performance in 
which Palestinians play the role that foreigners expect of them. 22 Lama put that scepticism aptly: 
 
[Protests] have become now in our society like rituals, like a wedding or a birthday 
party … All year we stayed silent until World Peace Day on 20th September. So then 
Peace Day comes and what do we have to do? A group of Palestinians has to go to stage 
a sit-in at the wall in Ni’lin, another group of Palestinians has to go and stage a sit-in at 
the wall in Gaza. But what about the rest of the year? Between the Peace Day 2008 and 
the peace day 2009? What have we done? Nothing. This is a real shame. 
 
Similarly to her critical analysis cited earlier, Lama here stresses the existence of multiple, 
contradictory and competing resistance discourses, practices and actors - this time focusing not on 
the discrepancies between family and nationalist institutions, but between the local and the global. 
Female nonviolent activism in particular has been tooted by international circles as a ‘modern,’ 
‘gender-equal’ and ‘civilised’ way to engage politically. It is not that surprising then that local 
activists selectively borrow from human rights, mother politics and religious discourses, and make 
use of ‘traditional’ vs. ‘modern’, ‘foreign’ vs. ‘culturally-authentic’ or ‘normalisation’ vs. ‘resistance’ 
paradigms to meet local, national and international expectations. Because of (rather than despite) 
this careful hybrid framing, they are able to build stronger platforms of support.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Although popular resistance has so far failed to bring about concrete material changes, it has 
launched a forceful challenge to established norms of female political agency in Palestine. As a 
‘counterpublic’, female resistance constitutes an unconventional political practice through which 
activists express alternative political identities and imaginaries. For Fraser, subaltern counterpublics 
‘are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate 
counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs’ 
(Fraser 1992: 123). Women’s political practices of dissent strive to publically and informally subvert 
and resist power differentials and injustices. The specificity and importance of particularly 
Palestinian women’s popular resistance actions as ‘counterpublics’ center on two main points:  
 
 
Firstly, women’s popular protest actions reformulate, repoliticise and enact new femininity 
constructions of women as courageous, heroic citizens. Although the mere fact that women invade 
political spaces traditionally defined as male does not necessarily mean that they gain (or want to 
gain) rights in the private sphere, their acts carry important gender-specific meanings and 
implications. ‘For women,’ as Cockburn (2007: 177) states clearly, ‘because of the way women are 
often reduced to the body and routinely sexualized, putting the body in play has a special meaning’. 
 
Adnan provided a telling description of women performing new gender models in the anti-wall 
protests in his village, asserting that it was ‘the first time that we saw women playing the role of the 
hero. It was clear that now their role is more than just to cry after their lost ones. Women were 
resisting together with the rest of us. They were very active, in the front lines.’ Using their bodies as 
shields, female protesters question and provide alternatives to both the nationalist-patriarchal 
reduction of women to wombs and essentialist accounts of women as nurturing peacemakers. By 
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defending their land, their means of subsistence, their family, community, nation and even their 
men, female activists reject the narrow binary association of the heroic life of public action and 
politics with men and masculinity, and the everyday life of nurturing and care with women and 
femininity (see e.g. Elshtain 1987; Enloe 1989). Although citizenship remains theoretical in the 
Palestinian quasi-state, women through their political practices and narratives reveal this exclusivist 
association of citizenship with the courageous male citizen. Doing so, they make – even if indirectly – 
claims for equal rights as citizens.   
 
 
Secondly, women’s popular protest actions as radical, yet democratic, acts of dissent, challenge 
conventional political practices which restrict Palestinian people’s political expressions to 
(corrupted) institutionalised channels, such as voting or membership in political parties. More 
specifically, Palestinian women’s popular protest methods, although technically not much different 
from men’s, point to the importance of informality which characterises grassroots politics under 
occupation, but is even more specific to women’s ways of doing politics in this context of interlinking 
political (occupation) and social (patriarchal) restrictions. If women go out to protest they confront 
and trespass not only restrictions set by Israeli occupation policies, but also internal patriarchal 
norms and forms of control. The fact that most of women’s activism in Palestine today is 
spontaneous and based on informal local women’s, family and community structures (rather than 
formal political networks and institutions such as the state, political parties or NGOs) does not make 
it irrational, ineffective or a-political. To the contrary: given the strict control by Israeli occupation 
authorities and/or Palestinian male leadership, women’s political spaces must remain unofficial so as 
not to be undermined. In this specific context women’s strategising to organise and participate in 
irregular, informal and ad hoc protests is highly political. 
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In sum, female popular resistance provides a radical alternative to mainstream politics, on the one 
hand, and male-dominated social and political culture in Palestine, on the other. In order for activists 
to move forward with such a potentially visionary agenda of a non-masculinist, non-hierarchical, 
non-militarist yet proactive political culture, what is needed is a more unified strategy. Under the 
current Israeli settler-colonial regime and the PA’s control over civil society) initiatives (particularly 
women’s) such a project seems difficult to achieve – but political change, as recent events in the 
Middle East show, is not always predictable. 
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Endnotes 
                                               
1 I use the term ‘popular’ (or ‘civil’), rather than ‘nonviolent,’ resistance here to reflect its usage by 
local activists. Palestinians tend to describe their (largely nonviolent) popular protest and boycott 
activism as al-muqawmah ash-sha’biyya (popular or civil resistance) in order to distinguish it from 
principled nonviolence (la ‘unf). The latter is often associated with a Western agenda aimed at 
‘pacifying’ (and thus weakening and/or commodifying) Palestinian popular resistance (see also 
Richter-Devroe 2009). 
2 Interviews were conducted mainly in Arabic, some in English and carried out predominantly in the 
framework of my PhD research on Palestinian women’s peacebuilding and resistance activism. I 
spent only 2 days in Gaza; the findings presented here are thus relevant for East Jerusalem and the 
West Bank only. 
3 For major works on women and gender relations in Palestine see Abdo (1994), Fleischmann (2003), 
Galvanis-Grantham (1996), Hammami (1990), Hasso (2005), Giacaman, Jad and Johnson (2000), Jad 
(1990, 2004, 2005), Peteet (1991), Sayigh (1992), Sharoni (1995), Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2009) and 
Taraki (2006).  
4 See e.g. Abdo (1994), Galvanis-Grantham (1996), Jad (2004), Peteet (1991). 
5 See e.g. Al-Labadi (2008), Jad (2005). For studies on Islamism and feminism more broadly see e.g. 
Moghissi (1999) or Badran (2009). 
6 For earlier studies on Palestinian women’s activism see e.g. Fleischmann (2003) or Jad, (1990, 
2004). 
7 See Abdo (1994), Jad (1990, 2004), Jean-Klein (2003) and Hiltermann (1993) for detailed studies on 
women’s participation in the First Intifada. 
8 Creating conditions of co-existence through cultural, political, social or economic cooperation 
between Palestinians and Israelis without acknowledging and attempting to transform the 
fundamental power asymmetries between occupier and occupied are rejected by the majority of 
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Palestinians as normalisation, as normalising the occupation and submitting to colonial rule (see 
Mi’ari 1999; Andoni 2003 or Richter-Devroe 2009). 
9 Most organisations have websites. See e.g. www.musalaha.org (Musalaha), www.aeicenter.org 
(The Arab Education Initiative), www.holylandtrust.org (The Holy Land Trust), www.alaslah.org (The 
Palestinian Conflict Resolution Centre Wi’am) or www.stopthewall.org/ (GPAAWC). 
10 Interview GPAAWC, 2008. 
11 Interview Feryal, 2008. 
12 Interview, Ilham, 2008. 
13 Interview, Im Fuad, 2008 
14 Interview Lama, 2009. 
15 Interview, Salwa, 2008. See also Jad, 2004 for a study that aims at recuperating particularly 
peasant women’s contribution to the Palestinian national struggle. 
16 Interview Suad, 2008. 
17 Interview Adnan, 2008. 
18 See Costain (2000: 179), Beckwith (2002), Cockburn (2007: 179). 
19 Focus Group B, 2008. 
20 Much of the documentation of the anti-wall demonstrations in Budrus, for example, has stressed 
the strong female participation, often presenting the local leader’s, Morrar’s, daughter, Iltizam, as 
new model actor for the anti-wall movement (e.g. Bacha, 2010)  
21 See e.g. Hammami (1997), Peteet (1991) or Al Botmeh and Richter-Devroe (2010). 
22 See also Jean-Klein’s (2002) analysis of “political audit tourism” during the First Intifada. 
